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Abstract
Recent theoretical literature in social policy argued that climate change posed a new risk to the
states and called for transformation from a traditional welfare state to an ‘eco’ state. From a
theoretical point of view, different welfare regimes may manage environmental/climate change
risks in a similar way to social risks. However, not much has been done to explore the issue
empirically. To this end, this paper aims to investigate public attitudes towards environmental and
traditional welfare policies given that environmental change is a new social risk the welfare states
have to address. Do individuals that care for one area also care for the other? That is, do the
preferences in these two policy spheres complement or substitute one another? We test these
hypotheses both at the individual- and country-level, using data from 14 countries included in all
three waves (1993, 2000, and 2010) of the environmental module in the International Social
Survey Programme. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between attitudes towards
income redistribution (indicator of support for welfare policy) and willingness to pay for
environmental protection (indicator of support for environmental policy). Our findings suggest
that attitudes in the two areas are substitutes in the total sample, but that the relationship is very
small and only statistically significant in some specifications. When we explore country
differentials, we observe clear heterogeneity in the relationship, which can be explained by
differences in political and historical contexts across countries.
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Introduction
It has become evident that under a business-as-usual practice, greenhouse gas emissions will
continue to rise and exceed the 2C threshold where global warming becomes irreversible
and catastrophic (IPCC, 2014). Thus, the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions is
urgent and at the heart of the climate talks among government representatives of over 190
nations in Paris in December 2015. The urgency of addressing climate change has been
recognised not only among climate scientists but also in the social sciences. This is well-
reﬂected in the introductory remark from a special issue of the American Psychologist,
stating that ‘global climate change poses one of the greatest challenges facing humanity in
this century’ (Swim et al., 2011).
Likewise, from a public policy perspective, the need to integrate climate change issues into
public policy making has been readily acknowledged. Given that wealthier countries have
greater capacity to aﬀord the costs of carbon emissions cuts than poorer countries (Borghesi,
2001), governments in most high-income countries have recognised that they have a
responsibility to act in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, such cuts will
be costly, leading to the question of who should bear the costs. Diﬀerent policy designs will
have diﬀerent winners and losers in terms of distributional outcomes. For instance, taxes on
home energy use usually have regressive eﬀects on low-income households because home
energy behaves as a ‘necessity’ good, i.e. its income and price elasticities are small (Jamasb
and Meier, 2010). In other words, low-income households spend a relatively high proportion
of their income on energy intensive activities such as heating and are unlikely to reduce
energy consumption even if taxes are increased. Conversely, targeting emissions from
personal transport has been shown to have progressive, inequality-reducing eﬀects since
poorer households ﬂy less and are less likely to own a car (Bu¨chs et al., 2011).1 Public
policies introduced to promote transition towards low-carbon and sustainable lifestyles,
hence, need to address such inequalities and conﬂicts. This includes, for instance,
designing complementary policies such as transfer payments or tax cuts that compensate
the regressive nature of carbon taxes in which the tax burden falls disproportionately onto
poorer households.
Whilst climate change is being recognised internationally as a ‘wicked’ or even ‘super
wicked’ policy issue (Levin et al., 2012; Rittel and Webber, 1973), ‘traditional’ public policy
issues like unemployment, income inequalities and poverty remain prominent at the national
level. Over the past two decades, demographic change, a reduction in economic growth rates,
increased economic and ﬁnancial internationalisation and the global economic downturn
have put great pressures on public ﬁnances. The shrinking work force, coupled with
increasing life expectancy, translate into inevitably higher social spending on health care
and pensions. Likewise, widening income inequalities in high income countries since the
1980s due to globalisation, technological change and shifts in family structures call for
welfare state interventions (Ursanov and Chivot, 2015). With climate change being a
source of new social risks on the one hand and ‘traditional’ social problems on the other,
it can indeed be problematic for countries to maintain ﬁscal and environmental sustainability
(Bailey, 2015). This raises a question of how the pie should be divided to achieve the best
possible synergy between social and environmental policies.
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Under the pressure of global environmental change, environmental management and
climate change mitigation and adaptation have gradually become a core area of state
responsibility. Following the modern environmental movement in the 1960s and the
1970s, sub-disciplines within the social sciences have increasingly addressed environmental
issues. In political science the study of environmental governance covering the topics related
to environmental politics, natural resource management and environmental policy is well-
established (Meyer et al., 1997; Newell, 2008; Paterson, 2009). In particular, the issue of the
intersection between economic growth and environmental sustainability has been a
dominant research theme.
The ﬁndings of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) in which certain forms of air
and water pollution decline as the level of national income increases, raises the puzzling
question of why environmental quality improves as countries become wealthier and more
industrialised (Cole et al., 1997; Dasgupta et al., 2001; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; but see
Bagliani et al., 2008 for an alternative interpretation). Both citizen’s increased demand for a
better quality of life once the country is economically developed – the post-materialism
theory proposed by Inglehart (1995) – and the capacity of wealthier countries to invest in
infrastructure, technological development and pollution control, explain this inverted
U-shaped curve (EKC) (Fiorino, 2011). Correspondingly, there is some evidence that
individuals who hold higher post-materialist values, tend to be more politically engaged
and mobilise more actively – for instance by signing a petition or taking part in a protest
– to inﬂuence or change environmental policies (Kelly et al., 2007).2
The crucial role that public opinions play in environmental mobilisation, coupled with the
new challenge of integrating climate policies into other policy areas make ‘squaring the
public policy circle’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2011) an extremely demanding task for democratic
governments. Since citizen’s attitudes towards public policies are partially shaped by self-
interest (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003), it is possible that public support for social and
climate change policies may not go hand in hand. Which policy dimension should be given
priorities pose challenges to governments in making costly policy solutions palatable to the
public. Since citizens are the recipients of policy, their attitudes have implications for the
legitimacy of these policies. In advanced democracies, the relationship between public
opinions and policy may be linked to the quality of democracy.3 As Jacobs and Shapiro
(1994) point out ‘[w]hen policies are habitually at odds with public opinion, this is considered
undemocratic [. . .]’. Indeed, it has been found that public policy and institutional
arrangements are correlated with public attitudes (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994; Kumlin,
2004; Skocpol, 1994).
Therefore, under the threat of the changing climate, if we are to succeed in transforming
modern democratic states into environmental welfare states or eco-social states, we need to
understand what drives attitudes both in the environmental sphere and with regard to
welfare policy. Ideally, we should uncover the extent to which the two spheres interact.
Since it would give policymakers an indication as to what kind of policies are likely to be
unpopular with voters and where there might be greater room for manoeuvre, such
knowledge would have relevance for policymaking. However, public attitudes in the two
policy ﬁelds have rarely been empirically analysed together. Analysis of these policy
interactions remains a relatively young research ﬁeld (Gough, 2010). This article makes
another step towards closing this gap by investigating whether there is a relationship
between developments in environmental attitudes and attitudes towards income
redistribution, using three waves of the environmental modules of the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP).
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Research questions and hypotheses
In this study, we ask whether public attitudes towards income redistribution are related to
the willingness to pay to protect the environment. We look at two indicators that measure
how willing an individual is to give up part of their wealth to reduce social inequalities and to
improve the quality of the environment respectively. Here we examine two straightforward
competing hypothesis: (1) Crowding out: Environmental and social concerns are substitutes,
i.e. persons who attach a high priority to environmental protection are less concerned about
governmental eﬀorts to protect against social risks; and (2) Double-worry: Those concerned
about ‘traditional’ social questions and who support redistribution through the welfare state
also tend to worry about the environment and are willing to pay to protect the environment.
We test the two hypotheses both at the individual- and country-level, using the ISSP data as
described in Section ‘Data and measurement’.
There is a rich comparative literature on public attitudes on environmental issues
(Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Franzen and Vogl, 2013; Gelissen, 2007) as well as on
questions like redistribution and the responsibility of governments in providing social
protection and care (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Kulin and Svallfors, 2013;
Reeskens and Oorschot, 2013). Whilst these two streams of literature represent a natural
starting point for exploring potential interactions between environmental and welfare
attitudes, attitudes towards environmental issues and welfare state questions have rarely
been explored together. A recent empirical study focusing on Australia by Spies-Butcher
and Stebbing (2016) examines the relationship between prioritising environmental and global
warming concerns and support for welfare state expansion and ﬁnds that there is a strong
overlap in preferences towards the two issues. Still, their study does not explicitly investigate
attitudes towards welfare and environmental policies. Moreover, looking only at a single
country, it does not provide knowledge of diﬀerences (or similarities) across countries.
Recently, there has been emerging literature that explores the potential interactions of
climate change and climate policies with social policy and welfare state issues (Fitzpatrick,
2014; Gough, 2010, 2013; Koch and Mont, 2016; Meadowcroft, 2008, 2005; Somestad,
2012). In particular, these scholars recognise ecological challenges such as climate change,
deforestation and land degradation as sources of new social risks which have implications
for social policy arrangements and may require new kinds of policy solutions (see e.g.
Johansson et al., 2016; Schaﬀrin, 2014). In this sense, both welfare states and
environmental states play a similar role in addressing negative market externalities.
Duit (2016: 71) uses the term ‘environmental state’ to describe a state that adopts a
continuous focus on social–environmental interactions. This concept denotes real-world
examples or approximations of an ideal-type green state (or ecological state) (e.g. Dryzek
et al., 2003; Eckersley, 2004), conceived as a liberal democracy4 practicing ‘ecologically
responsible statehood’ (Eckersley, 2004: 2). According to Duit (2016: 73) the
environmental state comprises four basic resources that the state employs to deal with
environmental externalities. These include: (1) environmental regulations, institutions and
policies; (2) organisations and agencies for environmental public administration; (3)
environmental taxes and spending for the redistribution of resources; and (4) production
and dissemination of environmental knowledge through scientiﬁc studies and environmental
monitoring programmes. In addition to these four policy instruments, one could also add
decentralised ‘network governance’, which involve interactions between various agencies
such as nongovernmental organisations, corporations, activists and public oﬃcials
(Dryzek, 2013; Jordan et al., 2003). Whilst some of the alternative environmental policy
instruments are market-based, other collaborative governance strategies include voluntary
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agreements, for instance, between regulators and corporations. The state may share with
industry the responsibility to address environmental challenges (see Jordan et al., 2003: 11).
Sustainable development, following a path of ecological modernisation (a concept that we
return to in the concluding discussion), necessitates broad partnerships, not only between
government and business, but also scientiﬁc expertise and civil society pressure groups (see
Dryzek, 2013: 170–177).
These environmental mandates and strategies may overlap with pre-existing economic
and security arrangements which also require state intervention (Duit et al., 2016;
Meadowcroft, 2005). Whilst characteristic forms and the instruments for reallocation of
obligations and entitlements of the welfare state and the environmental state operate in
separate departmental silos (Gough, 2016), they may compete for public resources in
terms of funding as well as administrative capacity at the stage of policy implementation.
Subject to tight budgetary constraints, the welfare states are under pressure to ensure
equity and justice of policy outcomes and fair distribution of costs and burdens between
social groups. Modern states are subject to state ‘imperatives’ in which they are expected
to ensure balance between economic prosperity, public services provision, security and
environmental protection (Hunold and Dryzek, 2002). In this regard, both social
protection and climate policy are rooted in the social justice discourse (Eckersley, 1992).
This particularly concerns the issues of distributive justice, i.e. the fair distribution of
socio-economic and natural resources. Environmental justice deals with equitable
distribution of environmental beneﬁts and risks. Environmentally hazardous sites such
as waste disposal, manufacturing industry and energy production, for instance, are often
located close to poor and/or minority-dominated residential areas. Such environmental
discrimination paved way to environmental justice movements like the one in the
southern United States in the 1980s (Bullard, 2000) and in South Africa in the 1990s
(Khan, 2002).
Therefore, similar to the provision of public goods like public education, housing and
health services to protect against market failure, climate policy, such as investment in cleaner
energy production, is a strategy to counteract the eﬀects of the market’s externalisation of
environmental costs. Whilst the welfare state already has the institutions, processes and
policies in place to accommodate environmental sustainability and climate goals (Duit,
2011), it is possible that climate polices might compete with social policy for resources
and attention and weaken the traditional concerns of social justice. Consequently, in the
future it will be important to design social policies that are able to mitigate the inequalities
and conﬂicts that may emerge in the transition towards more eco-friendly welfare states as
well as are attractive to electorate (Koch and Fritz, 2014).
Unlike the welfare state where class-based interests are at the centre, concerns about the
environment which are the base of collective pressure on government, are more often
expressed among more educated and aﬄuent groups (Gough, 2016). Whether the public
favour redistribution and/or environmental policies thus depends on both individual
preferences and the national context. At the individual level, public attitudes towards
certain policies are determined by elements of self-interest, ideology and political
preferences. According to the self-interest argument, individuals who beneﬁt from given
welfare policies or are at risk of becoming ﬁnancially dependent on the welfare state, are
more likely to support such programmes (Hasenfeld and Raﬀerty, 1989). Hence, those who
are socioeconomically vulnerable, e.g. have low income, education and occupational status,
are more likely to favour a system in which incomes and wealth are evenly distributed
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Jæger, 2006). In this sense, whether individuals support
only welfare policies or only environmental policies or both, depends on their self-interest.
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Individuals from low-income households may, for example, be supportive of income
redistribution but less sympathetic towards higher tax on home energy use.
Individual opinions towards public welfare provision and environmental policies are also
rooted in systems of political orientations and ideological preferences. Empirical studies have
documented that individuals’ support for public responsibility for welfare provision are
correlated with their subjective position on the left/right continuum, egalitarian ideology
and beliefs about social justice and social mobility (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Calzada
et al., 2014; Linos and West, 2003). Whilst typical left and right parties were clearly divided
on economic programmes, environmental or green issues were not straightforwardly
accommodated in the traditional left/right framework. On the one hand, there are authors
who argue that environmentalism represents an additional political dimension orthogonal to
the traditional economic dimension (Carter, 2001). If this is the case, pro-welfare voters may
not necessarily be pro-environment. On the other hand, some scholars have argued that
environmentalism should follow the established left/right party alignment, especially within
a leftist identity (Inglehart, 1990; Knutsen, 1995). There is evidence that political parties and
individuals who are self-identiﬁed on the left of the political spectrum, are more likely to
embrace pro-environmental positions including agreeing to pay higher taxes to prevent
environmental damages and support publicly ﬁnanced environmental protection
programmes and climate policy (Neumayer, 2004; Torgler and Garcı´a-Valin˜as, 2007;
Ziegler, 2017). In this regard, public support for welfare and environmental policies
supposedly goes hand in hand.
At the same time, country-level characteristics also aﬀect public attitudes towards social
and environmental policies. The development of various regime types of welfare states has
been attributed to the history of class coalitions with, for instance, the coalition between the
middle classes and the working classes forming the social democratic regimes (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The institutional characteristics of the welfare regimes, in turn, can
inﬂuence attitudes and opinions towards social programmes (Edlund, 1999). It is expected
that social democratic welfare states should be in a better position to handle the intersection
between welfare and environmental policies (Dryzek, 2008). Since these states rely on more
extensive state intervention, in general, policymakers as well as citizens are likely to accept
higher levels of taxation and market regulation (Svallfors, 2013). In such regimes, both
environmental and economic values can be mutually reinforcing since both issues require
state regulation and collective investment. In contrast, in liberal welfare regimes, welfare
support for medium-income groups is comparatively weak resulting in high levels of poverty
and social inequality. Hence, there are likely to be conﬂicts between public welfare and
environmental policy since low-income households are less able to face higher energy
costs or invest in energy saving measures (Schaﬀrin, 2014).
According to the literature on individual and country level determinants of public
attitudes described above, public support for social and environmental policies can
compete with one another (e.g. welfare recipients supporting redistribution programmes
whilst people vulnerable to environmental change favour pro-environmental policies) or
go hand in hand (e.g. believing in an active state in both spheres). Koch and Fritz (2014)
is, to our knowledge, the only study that has empirically investigated the linkages between
social and environmental policies. In particular, using a set of questions on environmental
attitudes in the ISSP 2010 data, the study explores whether social democratic welfare states
are more eco-friendly than conservative and liberal welfare states as measured by country-
level ecological performances. They investigated whether individuals living in social
democratic welfare states are more concerned about the environment than economic
growth, more in favour of government intervention to protect the environment and more
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willing to cut the standard of living to protect the environment. They ﬁnd evidence neither of
better ecological performances nor of greater support for environmental policies in social
democratic welfare states. These ﬁndings suggest that there are no spillover eﬀects from
states that favour welfare policies tackling socioeconomic inequalities to green policies
addressing environmental issues.
Although the work of Koch and Fritz (2014) provides some empirical insight into a
possible synergy between welfare and environmental policies, they do not explicitly
capture the potential budgetary tensions between the two policy choices. Indeed, social
spending on welfare programmes such as pension and unemployment beneﬁts may
compete with expenditure for policies to protect the environment. There is evidence
that changing governments’ priorities towards pressing ﬁnancial and social issues due
to the economic recession have led to budget cuts in the green economy development
such as investments in clean technology and renewable energy schemes (Obani and
Gupta, 2016).
Data and measurement
Data
This study is based on the environmental module of the ISSP comprising three cross-
national surveys conducted in 1993, 2000 and 2010. The ISSP is an ongoing cross-
national collaboration covering topics of importance to the social sciences since 1984.
The ISSP surveys employ a common sampling and methodological framework making the
data comparable across countries and time. Although sampling procedures vary by country
ranging from probability cluster sample, stratiﬁed random sample to random equal
probability sample, they are designed to ensure national representativeness including
at least 1000 respondents per country per year. Respondents were adults aged 18 years
and older.
The environmental module includes numerous measures of attitudes towards
environmental-related issues including respondents’ behaviour and preferences regarding
governmental measures on environmental protection. The data also contain basic
demographic information such as age, sex, education and occupation. In order to track
development over time, in this study we include the countries participating in all three
waves of data collection (1993, 2000, and 2010). This gives a total of 50,516 respondents
in 14 countries with valid responses to the attitudinal questions relevant for the present
study.
Measurement
Dependent variable. We focus on the willingness to pay as an indicator of the propensity to act
to protect the environment using two survey items: (1) ‘How willing would you be to pay
much higher prices in order to protect the environment?’; and (2) ‘How willing would you be
to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?’. The respondents were asked
to state if they were very willing or very unwilling to do this on a ﬁve point Likert-scale for
each of the two survey items. We reversed the order of the two items, added them together
and divided the answers by two to harmonise the scale between 1 and 5.
We focus on the questions related to the willingness to pay for the environment
rather than the questions on environmental attitudes such as those indicating the
perception towards humans’ contribution in harming the natural environment. As
argued by Kachi et al. (2015), it is the policy preferences rather than the risk
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perception that is important for policy making. They further argue that individuals can
be aware of environmental problems without supporting policies that tackle the issues.
Moreover, in the discussion about proper measurement of environmental attitudes,
Franzen and Vogl (2013) highlight the diﬀerence between having insights into
environmental problems and being willing to do something about them. Unlike the
survey items that capture environmental concern, willingness to pay oﬀers a more
precise measure of propensity to act for the environment. Furthermore, willingness to
pay for environmental protection corresponds better with the item on redistribution
preferences, which will be used as an indicator of welfare attitudes.
Explanatory variable. Whilst the ISSP environmental module is rich on items measuring
environmental attitudes and concern, there is only one item related to welfare attitudes.
Here we use the question that measures attitudes towards income redistribution: ‘It is the
responsibility of the government to reduce the diﬀerences in income between people with
high incomes and those with low incomes.’ The respondents were asked to state if they
strongly agree or strongly disagree to this statement on a ﬁve point Likert-scale.
Attitudes towards income redistribution lie at the heart of welfare policies. Redistribution
involves transfer of income or wealth from those who have more to those who have less. This
means high income individuals have to, for instance, pay higher taxes in order to redistribute
to others. Support for redistributive policies, hence, may not coincide with willingness to pay
for environmental protection since the latter also requires individuals to give up part for
their income for the environment. By using the survey items that capture willingness to pay
for the environment and support for income redistribution, we are able to directly test our
hypotheses.
Control variables. In addition to the main variables of interest, we also include a set of
individual level control variables for the analysis considering the individual level (gender,
age, age squared, education and employment), household level (household composition and
income), and a set of country level control variables for the time series cross sectional (TSCS)
analysis. These control variables are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Descriptive results
Figures 1 and 2 present average willingness to pay for environmental protection and average
redistribution attitudes by country and survey year, respectively. In the total sample, there is
a negative trend in the willingness to pay for environmental protection (F(2, 50513)¼ 754.59,
p¼ 0.000), and a positive trend in redistribution attitudes (F(2, 50513)¼ 60.09, p¼ 0.000).
The downward trend for willingness to pay for the environment is present for almost all
studied countries, not only for the total sample. Regarding redistribution attitudes the trend
is slightly mixed for the individual countries but in general most of them have experienced an
increase in support for income redistribution.
In Figure 3, we present how the attitudes regarding both the willingness to pay for
environmental protection and attitudes towards redistribution vary by age in the three
waves of data collection. There is a clear pattern showing that for all ages the willingness
to pay is considerably smaller in 2010 than in 1993, similar to what shown previously in
Figure 1. Thus, we see clear decreases in willingness to pay for environmental protection
during the investigated period. As already noted by Franzen and Vogl (2013), for a broader
measure of environmental concern, this negative trend takes place in a period where wealth
has increased in most of the studied countries. As opposed to the trends in willingness to pay
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Figure 1. Willingness to pay for environmental protection by country and survey year.
Note: Willingness to pay for environmental protection vary between 1 and 5 where a higher number implies
higher willingness to pay.
Figure 2. Support for income redistribution by country and survey year.
Note: Redistribution attitudes vary between 1 and 5 where a higher number implies more positive attitudes.
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to protect the environment, people tend to be more supportive of redistribution in 2010 than
in 1993, at least in the younger age groups.
Empirical strategies and results
The next step is to investigate whether these attitudes are in any way related. Do individuals
that care for one of the areas also care for the other? That is, do they complement or
substitute each other? Here we assess two competing hypotheses as described above: (1)
Crowding out: persons who are willing to pay to protect the environment are less
supportive of redistributive policies; and (2) Double-worry: persons who care about social
inequalities and support for redistribution are also concerned about the environment and
have greater willingness to pay for environmental policies.
Evidence at the country level
As a ﬁrst step to investigate this issue, we use the country/year mean values in Tables 1 and 2
to study if country level changes in redistribution attitudes are associated with changes in
willingness to pay. As a point of departure, we use the following empirical speciﬁcation:
WTPi,t ¼ 0 þ 0 Redistributioni,t þ 1Xi,t þ ci þ ei,t ð1Þ
where WTPi,t is the mean willingness to pay for environmental protection in country i, year
t. Redistributioni,t is the mean redistribution attitudes in country i, year t, Xi,t is a vector of
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Figure 3. Willingness to pay and redistribution attitudes by age and survey year in 14 countries.
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control variables (population, GDP, and greenhouse gas emissions), ci is an unobserved time
invariant disturbance term (e.g. unobserved factors that may be important for the
willingness to pay for environmental protection), and ei,t is an unobserved time variant
disturbance term.
The results using equation (1) are presented in Table 1. Model 1 is a random eﬀects
model where country ﬁxed eﬀects and wave eﬀects are not included. Model 2 includes
country ﬁxed eﬀects whilst in model 3 wave eﬀects are further added. Model 4 include
control variables (population, GDP, and greenhouse gas emissions). The coeﬃcient on
redistribution is only statistically signiﬁcant in the most basic model (Model 1) and
indicates that as support for redistribution in a country increases by one unit,
willingness to pay for environmental protection decreases by 0.236 units in that
country. This observed small negative eﬀect, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant in
Models 2–4. Once we include country ﬁxed eﬀects, wave ﬁxed eﬀects and control
variables, the negative relationship between willingness to pay for environmental
protection and support for redistribution disappears. At the country level, we thus ﬁnd
Table 1. Country average WTP for environmental protection explained by redistribution attitudes.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Redistribution 0.236** 0.573 0.245 0.227
(0.091) (0.363) (0.243) (0.208)
Controls No No No Yes
Wave FE No No Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 14 14 14 14
Number of observations 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.705 0.761
Note: All three models include 14 countries and 42 country/year observations. Control variables are population, GDP, and
greenhouse gas emissions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The full models are presented in Table A2 in the
Appendix.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.5.
Table 2. Individual willingness to pay for environmental protection explained by redistribution attitudes.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Redistribution 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls No No No Yes
Wave FE No No Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 49,402 49,402 49,402 49,402
R-squared 0.002 0.028 0.055 0.092
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are gender, age, age squared, education, household
income, employment status and household composition. The full models are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.5.
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no support for the double-worry hypothesis and only very limited support for the
crowding out hypothesis.
Evidence at the individual level
Next, we move on to the individual level analysis. As a point of departure, we use the
following empirical speciﬁcation:
WTPi ¼ 0 þ 0Redistributioni þ 1Xi þ ei ð2Þ
where WTPi is the willingness to pay for environmental protection for individual i.
Redistributioni is the redistribution attitudes of individual i, Xi is a vector of individual
control variables (gender, age, age squared, education, household income, employment
status and household composition) and ei is an unobserved error term.
In Table 2, we run individual level regressions with willingness to pay for environmental
protection as a dependent variable and redistribution attitudes as an independent variable
(equation (2)). As can be seen in the ﬁrst three models, the relationship between willingness
to pay and support for redistribution are negative but the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is very
small. In Model 4, we include a set of control variables (gender, age, age squared, education,
household income, employment status and household composition) and here the coeﬃcient
is very close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, our results at the individual level
imply that there are some weak crowding out concerning attitudes towards social and
environmental policies, i.e. individuals are more willing to pay to protect the environment
tend to be less supportive of redistribution, even though the relationship is fairly small.
Country heterogeneity in individual level willingness to pay and support for distribution
As a ﬁnal step, in Table 3, interaction terms between redistribution attitudes and country
dummies are added as an extension from Model 4 in Table 2 to assess potential cross-
country heterogeneity in the relationship between the willingness to pay for environmental
protection and redistribution attitudes. Table 3 displays the relationship between willingness
to pay for environmental protection and redistribution attitudes by country. As we can see,
the redistribution coeﬃcient of 0.008 in Model 4 in Table 2, in fact, varies considerably by
country. In four countries (Bulgaria, Russia, Czech Republic, and Germany), we observe a
statistically signiﬁcant and negative relationship. In ﬁve countries (Slovenia, Israel, Japan,
Spain, and Great Britain), the relationship is not diﬀerent from zero. Finally, in ﬁve
countries (Canada, New Zealand, Philippines, Norway, and USA), the relationship is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Results for redistribution, by country. Estimation follows equation (2), includes country
ﬁxed eﬀects and wave ﬁxed eﬀects. Control variables are gender, age, age squared,
education, employment, and household composition. Robust standard errors are used.
The full table is presented as in Appendix A Table A4.
Discussion
Using the environmental module of the three rounds of the ISSP surveys, we have
empirically investigated the links between public attitudes towards the welfare and
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environmental responsibilities of the state. More speciﬁcally, we asked whether individuals
that care for one of the areas also care for the other. That is, do the two dimensions
complement or substitute one another? We tested these hypotheses both at the individual-
and country-level, using OLS and panel data models. Our ﬁndings suggest that attitudes
towards welfare and environmental policies, if anything, are substitutes (crowding out), but
the relationship is rather small and only statistically signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations.
This ﬁnding is consistent with that of Koch and Fritz (2014) who reported no evidence
that social-democratic welfare states (where inequalities are low and support for
redistributive policies is high) are in a better position to develop as a ‘green’ or ‘eco’ state.
Duit’s (2016) comprehensive study of diﬀerent types of environmental governance regimes
further supported this ﬁnding. The latter concludes that there is no evidence that
environmental states overlap with the type of welfare states that are likely to be
environmentally progressive. In other words, environmental performance of a country
with redistributive policies is not necessary better than other countries with high levels of
inequalities. Similarly, in our case, at both the country and individual levels, after controlling
for relevant characteristics, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant relationship between willingness
to pay for the environment and support for income redistribution. Whilst this may be
considered as good news for policy makers in that public endorsement of environmental
policies do not compete with support for welfare policies, the absence of connection also
implies that there is no intersection between the two policy spheres.
At the theoretical level, it has been argued that policies to address the risks posed by
climate change – the most global and pressing environmental threat of this century – share
similarities with conventional social policies (Gough, 2016). Both the consequences of
climate policy and the impacts of climate change are not distributed evenly across
socioeconomic groups (van Ruijven et al., 2015). Consequently, Meadowcroft (2005,
2008) highlighted that both environmental and redistributive issues require political
Table 3. Relationship between WTP and redistribution attitudes by
country.
Country Redistribution
Bulgaria 0.122*** (0.027)
Russia 0.114*** (0.023)
Czech Republic 0.083*** (0.021)
Germany 0.054** (0.021)
Slovenia 0.027 (0.027)
Israel 0.017 (0.023)
Japan 0.014 (0.022)
Spain 0.004 (0.016)
Great Britain 0.025 (0.023)
Canada 0.056* (0.022)
New Zealand 0.079*** (0.022)
Philippines 0.086** (0.026)
Norway 0.116*** (0.022)
USA 0.130*** (0.022)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are gender, age, age
squared, education, household income, employment status and household
composition. The full model is presented in Table A4 in the Appendix.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.5.
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responses to long-term societal change that cannot be satisfactorily addressed by markets
and voluntary actions. We may situate this view within the approach known as ecological
modernisation, which suggests potential compatibility between environmental and economic
values in capitalist and democratic political economies (Dryzek et al., 2003: 11). The
reconciliation of values in the two spheres requires ‘conscious and coordinated
intervention’ through a holistic process (Dryzek, 2013: 170). Importantly, ecological
modernisation – even in its strong form – does not prescribe that governments abandon
capitalism as an economic system, but it demands comprehensive political and intervention
(Christoﬀ, 1996). As Dryzek (2013: 170) puts it, one cannot put faith in ‘any supposed
‘‘invisible hand’’ operating in market systems to promote good environmental outcomes
(of the sort Promotheans stress).’
Climate change and environmental problems are related to distribution of resources and
should be absorbed as part of the collective responsibilities of governments. For instance,
taxes on private energy consumption are likely to represent a disproportionate cost for the
poor, for whom it is more diﬃcult to reduce their (already low) level of consumption. It is,
thus, proposed that carbon or energy taxes should be accompanied by social beneﬁts, tax
credits or investments in energy eﬃciency in low-income households through energy tax
revenues (Gough et al., 2008). At least in theory, this shows that a synergy between
income redistribution, a traditional welfare policy and carbon pricing policy is, in fact,
possible. Whether this relationship exists also in practice, remains an empirical question,
which needs to be studied at the level of policy as well as with regards to individual attitudes.
The present article does the latter.
Our empirical analysis on diﬀerentials between countries depicted clear heterogeneity in
the relationships between support for redistributive policy and willingness to pay for
environmental protection. In Canada, New Zealand, the Philippines, Norway and the
United States, individuals who are willing to pay for the environment are also in favour
of income redistribution. Correspondingly, in these countries (except for the Philippines
where there seems to be no study on the topic), environmental attitudes have been found
to be clearly divided by political ideology and party preference. Individuals with more
liberal, egalitarian attitudes and less conservative are more inclined to believe in man-
made global warming and seriousness of climate change than are conservatives in Canada
(Lachapelle et al., 2012), New Zealand (Milfont, 2012), Norway (Tranter and Booth, 2015)
and the United States (Dunlap and McCright, 2008; McCright and Dunlap, 2011).
In contrast, in former communist countries including Bulgaria, Russia and the Czech
Republic, the relationship between willingness to pay for the environment and support for
income redistribution is negative. One plausible explanation for this ﬁnding is that post-
communist countries were less democratic and a series of evidence shows that generally less
democratic countries perform worse in environmental protection than democratic ones
(Farzin and Bond, 2006; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Neumayer, 2002). Meanwhile, post-
communist countries, especially central and eastern European states have maintained a
strong welfare commitment despite economic liberalisation (Kuitto, 2016). The
contrasting environmental performance and welfare policies in these countries may
explain our ﬁnding of the negative relationship between support for paying for the
environment and support for income redistribution. Another explanation is related to the
nature of public attitudes in post-communist countries. In fact, the issues of climate change
and the environment are less salient in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe as
compared to Western European countries (McCright et al., 2016). Not only were post-
communist respondents less active in taking measures to protect the environment
(Marquart-Pyatt, 2012), they were also more likely to give priority to personal economic
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security over environmental protection (De Bardeleben, 1997). Furthermore, unlike in
Western Europe, the distinctions between the left and the right with respect to the issues
of social and economic equality are much weaker in former communist countries (Tavits and
Letki, 2009). The crowding out pattern found, thus, implies that citizens of these countries
perceive environmental and social welfare policies as substitutes.
Note that we also observe a negative relationship in Germany but the eﬀect is rather
small. This is possibly due to the similarity between former East Germany and former
Communist countries. In fact, the negative relationship between willingness to pay for
environmental protection and support for income redistribution for Germany disappears
when focusing the analysis only on the more recent 2010 ISSP survey. For other countries,
namely, Slovenia, Israel, Japan, Spain and Great Britain, we found no signiﬁcant
relationship between the two spheres of policies. These countries are diverse in socio-
economic and political contexts, but it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse why
this is the case.
In fact, it is not an easy task to explain similarities and diﬀerences between countries.Whilst
it is possible to group countries into diﬀerent environmental governance regimes based on
governments’ environmental strategies such as regulations, taxation and organisations, it is
not clear why the countries have evolved into diﬀerent paths in environmental management
(Duit, 2016). Countries classiﬁed as environmental states such as the UK and the Netherlands
– the so-called liberal welfare state – display similarly strong environmentally-related
administrative and redistributive practices and regulations as Sweden, Finland and
Denmark – the so-called social democratic welfare state. Likewise, environmental
governance regime types do not follow established classiﬁcation schemes such as capitalism
classiﬁcations or majoritarian-consensual democracy dimension either (Hall and Soskice,
2001). A comprehensive review of factors associated with national environmental
performance by Fiorino (2011) concludes that there is no clear-cut institutional pattern to
explain national disparities in climate policies and environmental performance. Duit (2016:
87) noted that the lack of correlation with established classiﬁcation schemes is possibly due to
the abstract level of analysis employed in his study. Correspondingly, our analysis based on
public opinions may not reﬂect the actual eco-social policies in a country.
Our study has two main limitations that should be recognised. Firstly, our indicators of
support for social and environmental policy are based on self-reported information. This
type of attitudes questions is susceptible to social desirability bias if respondents of certain
characteristics systematically answer what is ‘correct’ or socially acceptable. Secondly,
although we have employed the questions that involve opinions towards sacriﬁcing one’s
wealth/income to reduce social inequality or for environmental protection, by nature of the
data, we are not able to measure actual behaviour. Still, since public disapproval can
undermine policy development, seeking to understand public opinion is worthwhile even
if it is not directly related to behaviour (Corner et al., 2011).
The main contribution of this study lies in our attempt to empirically investigate the
potential synergy between social and environmental policies. It was not until recently that
social policy scholars began to address climate change and environmental issues as new
challenges to the traditional welfare policies (Gough et al., 2008). Most of the extant
literature on the topic, however, is at the theoretical level with the exception of the study
by Koch and Fritz (2014). Even so, they did not directly compare two potentially competing
policy directions like ours in which individuals were obliged to envisage giving up part of
their income or wealth for environmental protection or reducing social inequality. In this
study, we are able to explore whether supports for social and environmental policy crowd out
or result in double-worry patterns.
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Conclusion
Although there is substantial country variation, in sum, we found no evidence of a double-
worry or synergy between support for environmental and welfare policies in the total sample.
One interpretation of our ﬁndings is that there are diﬀerent drivers behind preferences for
preserving the environment and preferences for income redistribution. Despite the fact that
both environmental and welfare policies address the issue of market externalities, the scale
and time horizon may diﬀer. Income redistribution is mainly a domestic issue and may yield
a direct beneﬁt to an individual whilst the beneﬁts from paying for the environment such as
carbon tax can extend beyond the national boundary and to future generations. Therefore,
we cannot expect that positive attitudes towards income redistribution will enhance the
willingness to pay for policies that beneﬁt the environment.
This suggests that policymakers are confronted with a considerable challenge in getting
the public on-board in the move towards the eco-social state. That is, if we are to succeed in
transforming modern democratic states into environmentally friendly welfare states or eco-
social states, policymakers have to work on two separate fronts. In conceptual terms, the
empirical ﬁndings we have presented arguably lend some support to the ecological
modernisation approach – particularly in the strong form (Dryzek, 2013: 176–177). We
need broad-based intervention and partnerships not only between government and
industry, but also other non-governmental actors, including the citizenry itself. This
approach is fundamental to the takeoﬀ of the institutional, economic and cultural
changes necessary to create environmental states that come close to the ideal green state.
The upshot of strong ecological modernisation is that to see long-lasting changes in
patterns of individual behaviour, it is necessary to get popular opinions on-board.5 That
is, if the public do not care or disagree with current measures to protect the climate and the
environment, they are unlikely to start behaving in a more environmentally friendly way.
For this to happen, we need a better understanding of how attitudes are formed and
inﬂuenced with regard to redistributive as well as environmental policy. This article has
addressed this issue making use of the best data currently available. However, as a ﬁnal
note, it is worth pointing out that the study would have beneﬁtted from access to better data.
We would like to see the development of richer datasets that allow for more detailed
comparisons of attitudes towards the welfare state and diﬀerent aspects of environmental
protection, including climate change mitigation.
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Notes
1. Note, however, that in countries like Australia and the United States, rising fuel prices increase
economic vulnerability of low-income households since they are more likely to live in outer
suburban locations with longer commuting time, poor public transportation and consequently
high levels of car dependence (Dodson and Sipe, 2008).
2. Nevertheless, note that at the local scale, there are also examples of grassroots protest movements in
less developed and poorer sector of the societies such as the tree-hugging Chipko and Appiko
movements in India (Fisher, 1993).
3. Note, however, that we do not suggest that the quality of democracy can be measured only based on
the extent to which it manages to fulfil the preferences of the majority. Advanced democracies also
have institutional arrangements and civil rights in place to protect minorities.
4. In other words, this school of thought are founded on the ideas of ecological modernization which
differs from the view that an ecological state demands authoritarian government (for an extreme
version of the latter view, see Heilbroner, 1974).
5. Although as pointed out above, we do not suggest that people’s opinions are a direct measure of
actual behaviour.
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Appendix
Table A1. Data description.
Description Source
Individual level variables
Gender Male¼ 0, Female¼ 1 ISSP
Age Age in years ISSP
Education No qualification¼ 0 (excluded category)
Primary¼ 1
Intermediate¼ 2
Higher secondary¼ 3
University degree¼ 4
ISSP
Employment Full time¼ 1 (excluded category)
Part time¼ 2
Unemployed¼ 3
In education¼ 4
Retired¼ 5
Housewife/man¼ 6
Disabled¼ 7
Other¼ 8
ISSP
(continued)
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Table A1. Continued.
Description Source
Household composition Single¼ 0 (excluded category)
Single with children¼ 1
Only adults¼ 2
Adults with children¼ 3
Other¼ 4
Missing¼ 5
ISSP
Household income First quintile¼ 1 (excluded category)
Second quintile¼ 2
Third quintile¼ 3
Fourth quintile¼ 4
Fifth quintile¼ 5
Missing¼ 6
ISSP
Country level variables
Population Number of inhabitants World Bank: World
Development Indicators
GDP Gross Domestic Product GDP (PPP),
million international dollars
World Bank: World
Development Indicators
Greenhouse gas emissions Total GHG Emissions Including Land-Use
Change and Forestry (MtCO2e)
Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Center
Table A2. Country average WTP for environmental protection explained by redistribution attitudes.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Redistribution 0.236*** 0.573 0.245 0.227
(0.091) (0.363) (0.243) (0.208)
Population 1.24e08***
(3.49e09)
GDP 9.45e08
(5.55e08)
Greenhouse gas emissions 0.0002
(0.0003)
Wave 2 0.244*** 0.254***
(0.060) (0.062)
Wave 3 0.418*** 0.438***
(0.075) (0.089)
Constant 3.631*** 4.832*** 3.882*** 3.006***
(0.321) (1.295) (0.854) (0.816)
Observations 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.705 0.761
Number of countries 14 14 14 14
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.5.
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Table A3. Individual willingness to pay for environmental protection explained by redistribution attitudes.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Redistribution 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender 0.042***
(0.010)
Age 0.002
(0.002)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
Education
Primary 0.054*
(0.023)
Intermediate 0.221***
(0.024)
Higher secondary 0.297***
(0.025)
University degree 0.592***
(0.026)
Employment
Part time 0.084***
(0.017)
Unemployed 0.058**
(0.023)
In education 0.234***
(0.025)
Retired 0.071***
(0.020)
Housewife/man 0.014
(0.019)
Disabled 0.109**
(0.038)
Other 0.050
(0.038)
Household composition
Single 0.029
(0.034)
Single with children 0.032
(0.018)
Only adults 0.025
(0.019)
Adults with children 0.047
(0.053)
Missing 0.041*
(0.021)
Household income
Second quintile 0.043*
(0.020)
Third quintile 0.128***
(0.020)
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Table A3. Continued.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fourth quintile 0.153***
(0.021)
Fifth quintile 0.236***
(0.022)
Missing 0.048**
(0.018)
Canada 0.356*** 0.353*** 0.341***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Czech Republic 0.185** 0.146** 0.083**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Germany 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.243***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Israel 0.421*** 0.432*** 0.411***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Japan 0.409*** 0.424*** 0.424***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
New Zeeland 0.352*** 0.350*** 0.369***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Norway 0.297*** 0.307*** 0.271***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Philippines 0.037 0.030 0.077*
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Russia 0.087** 0.090** 0.100**
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Slovenia 0.330*** 0.349*** 0.381***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Spain 0.168*** 0.240*** 0.355***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Great Britain 0.306*** 0.261*** 0.338***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
USA 0.413*** 0.420*** 0.426***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Wave 2 (2000) 0.253*** 0.223***
(0.012) (0.014)
Wave 3 (2010) 0.446*** 0.533***
(0.012) (0.014)
Constant 2.935*** 2.665*** 2.868*** 2.374***
(0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.058)
Number of observations 49,402 49,402 49,402 49,402
R-squared 0.002 0.028 0.055 0.092
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.5.
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Table A4. Relationship between WTP and redistribution attitudes,
by country.
Model 1
Redistribution 0.004
(0.016)
Gender 0.042***
(0.010)
Age 0.003
(0.002)
Age2 0.000
Education (0.000)
Primary
0.051*
Intermediate (0.023)
0.221***
Higher secondary (0.024)
0.301***
University degree (0.025)
0.588***
(0.026)
Employment
Part time 0.080***
(0.017)
Unemployed 0.053*
(0.023)
In education 0.232***
(0.024)
Retired 0.063**
(0.020)
Housewife/man 0.016
(0.018)
Disabled 0.115**
(0.037)
Other 0.058
(0.038)
Household composition
Single 0.023
(0.034)
Single with children 0.031
(0.018)
Only adults 0.022
(0.019)
Adults with children 0.042
(0.0531)
Missing 0.034
(0.021)
Household income
Second quintile 0.044*
(0.020)
Third quintile 0.134***
(0.020)
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Table A4. Continued.
Model 1
Fourth quintile 0.162***
(0.021)
Fifth quintile 0.249***
(0.022)
Missing 0.057**
(0.018)
Wave 2 (2000) 0.231***
(0.014)
Wave 3 (2010) 0.534***
(0.014)
Bulgaria 0.156
(0.115)
Canada 0.192*
(0.083)
Czech Republic 0.147
(0.082)
Germany 0.084
(0.081)
Israel 0.130
(0.090)
Japan 0.124
(0.084)
New Zeeland 0.226**
(0.080)
Norway 0.486***
(0.085)
Philippines 0.574***
(0.097)
Russia 0.192*
(0.093)
Slovenia 0.142
(0.110)
Great Britain 0.103
(0.086)
USA 0.287***
(0.079)
Interaction: Country dummyRedistribution
Bulgaria 0.122***
(0.027)
Canada 0.056*
(0.022)
Czech Republic 0.083***
(0.021)
Germany 0.054*
(0.021)
Israel 0.018
(0.023)
Japan 0.015
(0.022)
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Table A4. Continued.
Model 1
New Zeeland 0.079***
(0.022)
Norway 0.116***
(0.022)
Philippines 0.086**
(0.026)
Russia 0.114***
(0.023)
Slovenia 0.027
(0.027)
Great Britain 0.025
(0.023)
USA 0.130***
(0.022)
Constant 2.716***
(0.080)
Number of observations 49,402
R-squared 0.099
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.5.
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